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ABSTRACT 
One of the central questions in recent philosophical debate is whether motivation to act comes 
from cognitive or non-cognitive mental states. This question clearly is distinct from that of what is 
the meaning of moral sentences. Nevertheless, I think that an understanding of the nature of 
motivation is essential to an adequate account of moral language. For although not all motivated 
(and intentional) actions are susceptible to moral assessment, yet every action which is morally 
judged must be a motivated (as well as an intentional) one. In what follows I will try to defend 
ethical non-descriptivism by arguing for the internalist conception of motivation on which it is 
based.  
 
 
1. Metaethical theories 
  
Four different distinctions can be drawn between metaethical theories: 1) an 
ontological distinction between realism (according to which moral properties and 
facts do exist which are either reducible or irreducible to natural ones) and anti-
realism (which claims that there exist no moral properties or facts whatever); 2) an 
epistemological distinction between cognitivism (according to which moral 
judgements have a truth-value which can be known) and non-cognitivism (which 
maintains that they have no truth-conditions at all and cannot, therefore, be known 
to be either true or false); 3) a logical or conceptual distinction between 
descriptivism (according to which the meaning of moral judgements is determined 
completely by their truth-conditions, that is, they are purely descriptive statements) 
and non-descriptivism (according to which moral judgements are not entirely 
dependent for their meaning on truth-conditions, that is, they have an expressive 
function rather than a purely descriptive one); (4) a psychological distinction 
between the view that moral judgements express beliefs and the view that they 
express non-cognitive attitudes such as desires.  
The ontological distinction must be rejected because in one sense of the verb 
“exist” even a non-descriptivist may admit that moral properties and facts exist. In 
this sense, to say that a moral property or fact exists means that we can talk about it 
meaningfully, or truthfully, or that we can formulate a proposition whose subject is 
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the property or fact in question.(1) On the other hand, even a descriptivist may 
deny that moral properties and facts exist in rerum natura.(2) The epistemological 
distinction is just as unsatisfactory as the ontological one, since the epistemological 
question must be distinguished from that concerning the function of moral 
judgements. One may agree that they have a truth-value which can be known,(3) 
while holding that they not only have a descriptive meaning but also an evaluative 
meaning, which is independent of the former and primary to it.  
It seems preferable, then, to draw a logical (or conceptual) distinction rather than 
an ontological or an epistemological one. As regards the psychological distinction, 
however, I do not think (unlike Richard Hare) that it collapses into the logical or 
conceptual. True, since the beliefs and attitudes in question share the property of 
intentionality that all mental states have, their full characterization demands a 
proposition or “that”-clause which gives their content; that is to say, the full 
explanation of these psychological states demands a logical or conceptual 
explanation of the words in which they are or would be expressed. As we shall see, 
however, the distinction between beliefs and desires is central to non-descriptivism. 
For non-descriptivism is based on a kind of motivational internalism that depends 
crucially on that very distinction.   
 
 
2. Theories of motivation 
 
Theories of general motivation divide into internalist and externalist ones. As to 
motivational internalism, a distinction must be drawn between a strong and a weak 
version of it: while agreeing that desire is a necessary element of the state of being 
motivated, they disagree about what is the nature and role played by desire in 
moving us to act.  
Strong internalism holds that one is motivated to perform an action if, and only if, 
one wants to perform it for its own sake or as a means conducive to the desired 
object, and believes that performing that action will contribute to realizing her 
desire. This view is based on the claim that desires are non-cognitive states, that is, 
existences independent of beliefs. Strong internalists, however, do not obscure the 
difference between being motivated to act and having a desire to act. For they do 
not claim that motivation depends entirely on desire, but rather that desire can 
motivate only when combined with a belief about the means conducive to the 
desired end.(4) Desires as well as beliefs have no intrinsic motivating power: since 
desire and belief are distinct existences, they do not entail each other; so both of 
them are needed if an agent is to be moved to action. Yet strong internalists point 
out a disanalogy between desire and belief, that is, the fact that they play quite 
different roles in motivation: desire drives the agent and is the very source of 
motivation, whereas belief merely gives a direction to the pull exerted by desire.(5) 
Weak internalists, by contrast, deny that there is such a disanalogy and hold that 
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the fact that an agent did something intentionally and was, therefore, motivated to 
do it entails that she wanted so to act: that she had such a desire is merely a logical 
consequence of the fact that she acted. According to weak internalism, then, desire 
comes from belief.(6) On the other hand, motivational externalism maintains that 
motivation does not need any desire at all: since beliefs can motivate all by 
themselves, one may be motivated to do something even if one has no desire to do 
it. This view, however, entails weak internalism. For if it is a sufficient condition of 
one’s being moved to do something that one have a certain belief about it, then it is 
a fortiori true that the desire needed to move one to act comes from that very 
belief. In other words, belief is the ultimate source of motivation.  
As to theories of moral motivation, there are many different forms of internalism 
and externalism,(7) depending upon whether what the motivation is taken to be 
internal or external to is duty or the sense of duty, or a belief or judgement 
attributing a duty. I shall focus my attention on the relation between moral 
judgements and motivation. According to judgement internalism,(8) motivation to 
act morally is internal to moral judgements; that is, it comes from their very 
meaning. So it is not conceptually possible that one sincerely makes (or assents to) a 
moral judgement without being motivated to act accordingly.(9) Judgement 
externalism, by contrast, holds that the connection between moral judgements and 
motivation is causal or psychological, that is, external to the meaning of judgements. 
So one may sincerely judge that an action is right while lacking any motive to 
perform it.  
This view is consistent with descriptivism:(10) since the truth-value of a judgement 
does not depend on the speaker’s being in some particular psychological state, the 
judgement that an action is right can be true and guide conduct even if the person 
who made it has no motive to act accordingly. Such a view can account for the 
normative force of moral judgements. It seems, however, to fail to explain how they 
can move to action: if the agent is not in such a psychological state as to be moved 
to perform the action recommended by a certain judgement, then she will not be 
moved to perform that action while recognizing that the judgement is true. On the 
contrary, judgement internalism is consistent with, and indeed essential to, non-
descriptivism. This is one of the reasons why I shall focus my attention on 
judgement internalism. The other reason for doing so is that this thesis is of special 
interest not just because it represents important common ground between Humeans 
and Kantians, but also because it is central to understanding the sense in which 
moral judgements are practical.(11)     
 
 
3. Desires and beliefs 
 
Non-descriptivists subscribe to Hume’s argument about the inertia of reason: moral 
judgements have an intrinsic motivating force; motivation comes from a certain non-
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cognitive state of the agent such as a desire, feeling, attitude, or disposition to 
action, whereas beliefs (and cognitive states more generally) have no intrinsic 
motivating force; therefore, moral judgements are the expression of non-cognitive 
states. Thus, a non-descriptivist conclusion does follow from judgement internalism 
(which is the first premise of Hume’s argument),(12) together with strong 
motivational internalism (which is the second premise).  
There is no symmetrical relation, however, between metaethical theories, on the 
one hand, and theories of motivation, on the other. For although ethical non-
descriptivism does entail both strong motivational internalism and judgement 
internalism, not all varieties of descriptivism entail motivational externalism, nor do 
they entail judgement externalism.(13) Externalist descriptivists accept the strong 
internalist view that it is a necessary condition for one to be motivated to act that 
one be in a certain non-cognitive state. Yet they claim that moral judgements are 
not intrinsically motivating: their motivational force arises from something external 
to their meaning, such as a psychological state of the speaker. One is motivated to 
perform the action one judges one ought to perform only if she has a desire to do 
so; for the judgement describes a property of that action, and purely descriptive 
statements (as well as the beliefs they express) lack motivating force.(14) Internalist 
descriptivists, by contrast, accept judgement internalism; yet they reject the strong 
internalist thesis that desire is the ultimate source of motivation. They hold a weak 
internalist view of motivation. Because of its conception of desires as coming from 
certain cognitive states, weak motivational internalism is inconsistent with non-
descriptivism.  
If we are to refute descriptivism, therefore, we must argue for something more than 
judgement internalism. What metaethical conclusion does follow from it depends, in 
my opinion, on how desire is understood. If one adopts the weak motivational 
internalist view that desire derives from belief, then it follows from the thesis that 
moral judgements have an intrinsic motivating force, together with the thesis that 
some desire is necessary for one to be motivated, that moral judgements express 
beliefs (or other cognitive states); that is to say, they are purely descriptive 
statements. By contrast, from the strong motivational internalist view that desire is a 
non-cognitive state, together with judgement internalism, it follows that moral 
judgements are the expression of the speaker’s non-cognitive states, that is, they are 
not purely descriptive statements. Note that formulating strong motivational 
internalism in terms of the view that desires (as well as beliefs) lack the capacity by 
themselves to motivate makes it clear that in order to defend non-descriptivism, we 
must show that desires are distinct from, and independent of, beliefs. To put it 
another way, an enquiry into the nature of desire and its motivational role is crucial 
to non-descriptivism. Such an enquiry, however, has been neglected by non-
descriptivists.(15)  
The view that desire is a non-cognitive state can be argued for by appealing to the 
notion of a direction of fit of a mental state.(16) For this notion helps understand 
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what difference between the nature of desire and of belief prevents us from 
analyzing desires (or, at least, some of them) in terms of beliefs. Beliefs have a 
mind-to-world direction of fit, that is, they must fit actual states of affairs; for beliefs 
aim to track the truth, and must be forsaken if the states of affairs they represent do 
not correspond with the existing ones. Desires, by contrast, have a world-to-mind 
direction of fit, that is, they are states with which world must fit. Desire does not 
aim at truth but at satisfaction: if the actual state of affairs is different from that 
which is represented by the content of one’s desire, then one does not have to 
forsake that desire (unless it is physically impossible to realize it), but rather to try 
to change the actual state of affairs.(17) 
The appeal to the notion of a direction of fit in order to account for the difference 
between desire and belief is not an ad hoc strategy. For even a committed 
externalist like Jonathan Dancy points out that there is an asymmetry between the 
roles that these two mental states play in motivation and maintains that such an 
asymmetry can be explained in terms of opposite directions of fit.(18) In Dancy’s 
view, however, to say that desire plays a dominant role in motivation in comparison 
with the role of belief is not inconsistent with the claim that beliefs can give rise to 
desires: the question of what roles beliefs and desires play in motivation is distinct 
from that of what is their genealogy. Therefore, to say that the desire that moves 
someone to act comes from one of her beliefs does not entail denying that the role 
played by desire in exerting a pull on the agent is primary to the role played by the 
belief from which desire comes.(19)  
 
 
4. The akratic and the amoralist 
 
It is usually objected to ethical non-descriptivism that because it assumes that moral 
judgements have an intrinsic motivating force, it fails to explain akrasia and 
amoralism.  
Akrasia is an incapacity to be motivated to act, and to act, in accordance with one’s 
own evaluative (moral or non-moral) judgements. Such an incapacity is a sort of 
irrationality in that the agent acts contrary to her moral convictions: while admitting 
that the reasons for acting in accordance with her judgement are stronger than the 
reasons against doing so, she is not motivated to do so and intentionally acts 
contrary to her judgment, thereby acting on a desire she wants not to have more 
than she wants to. Akratic behaviour seems hard to be explained by non-
descriptivists because of their internalist view about the connection between moral 
judgements and motivation. For were this connection to be a conceptually 
necessary one, that is, a connection coming from moral judgements’ being the 
expression of certain non-cognitive states, then it would be hard to explain how 
could one judge that one ought to do something, yet fail to do it. The judgement, 
were it to be sincere, should be sufficient to move one to act even though one also 
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had a desire which pulled her in the opposite direction. So, were the agent to act 
intentionally and of her free will, then she should act in accordance with the 
judgement.  
It has been claimed that non-descriptivists fail to explain akratic behaviour because 
they do not distinguish between motivation coming from moral evaluations and 
motivation coming from desires. (20) Were it the case that people were moved to 
action by their own desires, as strong motivational internalism maintains, then it 
would be hard to explain the conflict, which often occurs in our daily lives, between 
motivation arising from one’s own sincere moral judgement and motivation arising 
from the pleasure one expects from acting contrary to one’s judgement. What 
would one be saying if, while so acting, one were to say that one wanted to act in 
accordance with her judgement? It does not make sense to say that one 
intentionally performed a different action from the one she wanted to perform, if 
the verb “want” is taken in a formal sense in which wanting is being motivated. For 
the fact that an agent who intentionally performed an action wanted to perform it is 
a merely logical consequence of the fact that she did so. If, therefore, someone who 
intentionally did something contrary to her own judgement said that she wanted to 
act in accordance with it, then the motive she had to do so must have been weaker 
than her motive to do what she actually did. On the contrary, it makes perfectly 
good sense to say that one intentionally performed a different action from the one 
she wanted to perform, if “want” is taken in an evaluative sense, in which if one 
wants to do a more than one wants to do b, then one ascribes a greater value to a 
than to b. According to the opponents of non-descriptivism, the evaluative sense of 
“want” must be distinguished from the motivational one, in which if I want to do a 
more than I want to do b, then I am motivated more strongly to do a than to do b. 
Akratic behaviour can only be explained by giving up the claim that the 
motivational force of a desire is proportional to the value that the desirer ascribes to 
the desired object.  
It seems to me that this objection to non-descriptivism might well be doubted. 
Granted, non-descriptivists would fail to account for akrasia, were they to reject the 
distinction between the evaluative and motivational senses of “want” (or “desire”), 
that is, were they to identify desire with a motivational state and to hold that having 
a desire is tantamount to being motivated. In my opinion, however, non-
descriptivists are not committed to accepting such a view of desire. Rather, this 
view is embraced by the very opponents of strong motivational internalism (such as 
Thomas Nagel). Moreover, if we regard moral judgments as sentences which 
express desires or other non-cognitive states, then it is not at all hard to explain the 
case of an agent who sincerely judges that she ought to perform a certain action, 
but wants to do something contrary to it and acts on this desire instead of that 
expressed by her judgement. Such a case can be described in terms of a conflict 
between two different (or even opposite) kinds of desire, that is, between a non-
evaluative desire, on the one hand, and an evaluative desire, on the other.(21) 
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Finally, non-descriptivists would be unable to explain akratic behaviour, were they 
to claim that moral judgements have such a motivating force as to override all the 
other desires the agent has. Note, however, that to say that it is not conceptually 
possible for one to judge that one ought to do something without being motivated to 
do it is not the same as saying that one’s judgement entails a stronger motivation 
than any other motive one might have to act otherwise. Hare is the only non-
descriptivist to claim that moral judgements have the property of 
overridingness.(22) 
Unlike the akratic, the amoralist has no motivation at all to act in accordance with 
moral judgements. Note that the reason why the amoralist acts contrary to a certain 
moral judgement is not that she has two opposite desires, the non-evaluative one 
overriding the evaluative. Nor does amoralist’s indifference to morals depend on 
her being unable to use moral language properly; for she does know full well how 
to use it. The point is that when the amoralist makes a judgement, she is using 
moral terms in an “off-colour” or “inverted commas” sense:(23) in her mouth these 
terms no longer have their standard evaluative meaning, but only their descriptive 
meaning. That is, when making a moral judgement, the amoralist simply quotes 
others’ judgement without accepting it. Unlike the akratic, who is unable to be 
moved to act on her own judgements, the amoralist is not unable to be morally 
motivated: were she to use moral language in an evaluative sense, then she would 
be moved to act morally. The point is, however, that the amoralist rejects the very 
institution of morals.  
According to David Brink, non-descriptivism fails to take amoralism seriously.(24) 
For if moral judgements are by their very meaning motivating, then the agent who 
is not at all moved to act on the judgement she made or assented to must have 
misunderstood its meaning. Non-descriptivists could only allow the conceptual 
possibility of amoralism if they embraced a weak form of judgement internalism, 
according to which the motivational force of moral judgements needs not override 
the motives an agent may have to act otherwise.(25) I do not agree with this 
objection. First, as I have already said, Hare is the only non-descriptivist to ascribe 
overridingness to moral judgements. Secondly, he rejects Brink’s characterization of 
the amoralist as someone who does use moral words evaluatively while not being 
motivated by her own judgements.(26) Nor would Hare accept the stronger view 
according to which the amoralist does not reject every moral value.(27) On this 
view, in rejecting morality the amoral agent appeals to values that can be shared by 
those who adopt the moral point of view. The amoralist rejects moral values not 
because they are moral values, but because they are incompatible with her own 
values. Note that this conception of amoralism relies on the assumption that features 
such as strength and self-reliance are values that those who embrace a moral 
perspective can share with the amoralist. Now, those features may be regarded as 
positive values, but some argument has to be provided for the view that they are 
morally significant. So it seems preferable to characterize the amoralist as someone 
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who rejects moral judgements entirely, rather than as someone who recognizes their 
normative force without being moved by them. Such definition allows one to claim 
that amoralism is compatible with the truth of the view that there is a necessary 
connection between making or sincerely assenting to a moral judgement and being 
moved to act on it. This is just the kind of judgement internalism on which non-
descriptivism is based. 
 
 
5. Motivated desires 
 
Weak internalists agree that someone who acted on her moral judgement wanted to 
do so. According to them, however, saying that one had such desire is the same as 
saying that the belief voiced in the judgement was sufficient to move her. Moral 
judgements describe certain properties of actions and have a motivating force which 
springs from the very beliefs they express; for it is a belief that generates the desire 
that one must have in order to be moved to act. And if it is true that beliefs are 
capable of generating desires, then it follows, from the combination of the thesis 
that moral judgements are intrinsically motivating with the thesis that motivation 
does not come from any desire (although desire is a necessary condition of one’s 
being motivated), that moral judgements are descriptive statements, that is, they are 
the expression of beliefs.  
Weak internalism is a coherentist theory of motivation, since it denies that any 
desire which moves to action is a basic one: every element of the agent’s 
motivational structure is coherent with some other element of it. In other words, 
there is no desire on which all the other desires depend. This view, however, seems 
to invite a regress. For saying that the justification of a desire depends, at least in 
part, on another desire is tantamount to saying that the former is not fully justified 
unless the latter is, which in turn can only be justified via another desire, and so on. 
In order to avoid such a regress, therefore, coherentists have to admit that there are 
at least some desires which cannot be justified or supported by other (justified) 
desires; that is, they have to acknowledge that at least some desires are directly 
justified. Yet coherentists reject the very idea that there is any directly justified 
desire. For they claim that justification is a function of certain relations between 
justified elements: every desire is at least in part justified by its relation to another 
desire. Note that such a claim forces coeherentists to acknowledge a circularity in 
the agent’s motivational structure. For support is a transitive relation, and human 
beings’ sets of desires are finite. So, if every desire belonging to the set of justified 
desires is supported by at least another desire belonging to that set, then every 
justified desire is at least in part self-justified, that is, it is justified at least in part by 
itself. Such a conclusion is not acceptable to coherentists (or weak internalists), 
since they reject the very notion of self-justification. How, then, can weak 
motivational internalism be argued for? 
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Nagel has tried to defend it by drawing a distinction between two kinds of desires: 
unmotivated desires (such as the appetites and in certain cases the emotions), which 
simply come to us, and motivated desires, which are arrived at by decision and 
after deliberation.(28) According to Nagel, strong internalism fails to draw such a 
distinction. Nagel maintains that the claim that a desire underlies every intentional 
act is true only if the term “desire” is taken in so broad a sense as to cover 
motivated as well as unmotivated desires. When one does something intentionally, 
one is motivated to do it because one thinks that there is a (justifying) reason to do 
so. There is no need, according to Nagel, to appeal to any distinct desire in order to 
explain motivation to act. Desire, although it is a logically necessary condition 
(because it is a logical consequence) of the motivational efficacy of the agent’s 
beliefs, is not necessary either as a condition contributing to such efficacy, or as a 
causal condition. That the agent has the appropriate desire simply follows from the 
fact that certain considerations move her to perform the action she actually 
performs.(29)  
It seems to me that Nagel’s account of the role of desire in motivation is quite 
puzzling. The first puzzle relates to the persistence of Nagel in the attribution of a 
desire to the agent even in cases in which the motivational burden is carried by 
reference to some cognitive state.(30) The second puzzle concerns the concept of a 
motivated desire. To appeal to this concept in order to refute strong motivational 
internalism is to assume that deliberation (by which an agent arrives at certain 
motivated desires) does not start from any unmotivated (i.e. basic) desire. For if 
deliberation were grounded on such mental states, then the motivation it generates 
would turn out to come ultimately from some unmotivated desires. To employ the 
concept of a motivated desire, therefore, Nagel must provide an argument for the 
view that cognitive states are the starting points of practical deliberation.  
 
   
6. Motivating cognitive states 
 
There is, however, another way to argue for the view that desires are not 
independent of beliefs, thereby refuting strong internalism. Weak internalists might 
try to point to certain cognitive states having both the mind-to-world direction 
distinctive of beliefs and the world-to-mind direction distinctive of desires. Were 
this strategy to succeed, strong internalism would be refuted by appealing to the 
very notion that is central to it.  
John McDowell has pursued such a strategy by focusing his attention on the 
virtuous agent’s mental state. According to McDowell, the virtuous agent is someone 
who sees the action she ought to perform in a favourable light; that is to say, she is 
able to recognize those features which make that action a morally good one, and to 
be motivated to perform it. The virtuous agent’s psychological state is both a belief 
and a desire: it is a cognitive state, since it consists of a peculiar way of seeing the 
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action that ought to be performed; yet it is also a motivating state, since to see a 
certain action in a favourable light is the same as being motivated to perform it. 
(31) McDowell points out, however, that such a mental state does not consist of two 
distinct mental states (that is, the belief that the action in question has certain 
features that make it right and the desire to perform it), since otherwise some 
account would have to be given of the relation between them.(32)  
McDowell agrees that those who act in accordance with a moral judgement may 
have some desire that will be realized by so acting. Yet he claims (as Nagel does) 
that desire is not a condition contributing to the motivational efficacy of the agent’s 
beliefs about the action at issue, which beliefs cast it in a favourable light. The 
desire that motivates the agent is not intelligible independently of the way she sees 
the action: to say that she wants to perform it is the same as saying that she is 
moved by her own beliefs about it. The action performed is a result of the agent’s 
exercising the capacity to see in a certain distinctive way her circumstances of 
action. It is such capacity (which is, according to McDowell, a sort of sensitivity) 
that enables the virtuous person to grasp the relevant facts of her own deliberative 
situation, and to decide how to act. Beliefs are neither distinct from desires, nor 
lacking in motivating force, as both the non-descriptivist and the externalist 
descriptivist would have it.(33) What holds for the virtuous agent’s psychological 
state also applies, according to McDowell, to perceptual states: perception that 
some features of an action are morally relevant cannot be analyzed into a cognitive 
and a non-cognitive element.  
It is to be noted that there is a parallel between McDowell’s rejection of the 
distinction between beliefs and desires (or between cognitive and non-cognitive 
elements in the virtuous agent’s psychological state), on the one hand, and his 
rejection of the distinction that non-descriptivists draw between descriptive and 
evaluative meanings of moral terms, on the other. Indeed, McDowell calls himself 
an “anti-noncognitivist”.(34) Were it possible to separate the descriptive meaning 
of moral words from their evaluative meaning, that is, to apply words like “right” to 
whatever kind of action, then a non-virtuous agent might see the action 
recommended by a certain moral judgement in just the same way as the virtuous 
agent sees it without yet being moved to perform it. McDowell, however, points out 
that it is not that these two agents have the same beliefs about non-moral features of 
the action in question, while differing from each other just in that only the virtuous 
agent wants to perform it. For it is not possible, according to McDowell, to see that 
an action has certain right-making features without having any pro-attitude toward 
performing it. The point is that the two agents have different beliefs about the same 
action, and the way the virtuous agent sees it is not neutral from an evaluative 
standpoint. (35) So her desire to perform the action can only be understood by 
seeing that action as she sees it. (36) 
It might be objected to McDowell, however, that if the connection between believing 
that an action has certain features and being motivated to perform it were grounded 
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on the agent’s having a virtuous character, then beliefs would turn out not to be 
what moves her, but rather the expression of her capacity to be motivated to act 
morally. McDowell does not explain how someone who sees her own deliberative 
situation in the way distinctive of the virtuous could thereby come to have a 
disposition to act morally. What McDowell says seems to suggest that only those 
who already are virtuous can come to have the cognitive and motivating state 
peculiar to the virtuous, that is, to see the situation they find themselves in as the 
virtuous person would do.  
Most importantly, McDowell’s account of the virtuous agent seems to be 
inconsistent with the possibility of akrasia (or, to use Michael Stocker’s term, (37) 
of other “depressions”, such as apathy, despair, and a feeling of uselessness or 
futility). If the virtuous agent’s belief that a certain action has some features which 
make it a morally wrong one could not be distinguished from the desire to perform 
it, then, were she to lose her desire to act morally, it would be at least possible that 
she also lose the cognitive capacity to see that action in a favourable light. If, for 
example, someone who has always wanted to make shy persons feel at their ease 
loses such desire, then it follows from McDowell’s account that she will be no 
longer able to grasp their shyness. I do not agree with such an account of akrasia. 
For the akratic is unable to perform the actions she ought to perform, while 
recognizing that she ought to perform them and believing that the reasons for them 
are stronger than contrary ones. The akratic sees these actions in the same way as 
the virtuous agent would see them, and faces with a conflict just because she is still 
able to see what she ought to do and what is the moral cost of her not doing it. 
McDowell should show that akrasia undermines the agent’s cognitive capacities. 
What is more, he should provide reasons in support of the view that capacity to see 
what ought to be done is a cognitive capacity.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
Metaethics is closely related to theory of motivation. My point in this paper has 
been that an enquiry into motivation, the role played by desire in it, and the nature 
of desire itself is essential to a defence of the non-descriptivist view that moral 
judgements are not purely descriptive statements, but rather the expression of 
certain non-cognitive attitudes. This view relies on two distinct theses, both of which 
concerning motivation: judgement internalism, which holds that moral judgements 
have an intrinsic motivational force, and strong motivational internalism, according 
to which motivation comes via desires that are independent of any cognitive states. I 
have argued that proponents of the former thesis can explain both akratic and 
amoralist behaviour, contrary to what the externalist claims. Then I have argued for 
the latter thesis, by rejecting both Nagel’s argument for the view that the desire 
needed for motivation comes from a belief, and McDowell’s argument for the view 
that such a desire cannot be distinguished from belief.(38)  
 11
 
 
Note 
 
(1) Cf. R.M. Hare, Ontology in Ethics (1985), in his Essays in Ethical Theory 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989), pp. 86-87. 
(2) John L. Mackie is the most famous proponent of an “error theory”, according to 
which moral judgements have a truth-value, but are uniformly false because the 
moral properties they ascribe to actions, persons, or states of affairs do not exist 
(see his A Refutation of Morals, “Australasian Journal of Psychology and 
Philosophy” 24 [1946]: 77-90, and Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong: 
Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1977). 
(3) Cf. R.M. Hare, Objective Prescriptions (1993), in his Objective Prescriptions and 
Other Essays (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999), p. 4.   
(4) Hume himself, to whom this theory can be traced back, insists only that beliefs 
lack motivating power, without pronouncing on whether a desire can by itself 
motivate action (cf. A Treatise of Human Nature [1739-1740], ed. by L.A. Selby-
Bigge, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1888, pp. 118-119). 
(5) Cf. R. Audi, Acting for Reasons, “The Philosophical Review” 95 (1986), p. 
513. 
(6) Cf. M. Smith, The Humean Theory of Motivation, “Mind” 96 (1987), p. 36. 
(7) The distinction between internalist and externalist views about moral motivation 
was introduced by William D. Falk, who adopted the former (cf. ‘Ought’ and 
Motivation [1947-1948], in his Ought, Reasons, and Morality. The Collected Papers 
of W.D. Falk [Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1986], p. 40). 
(8) The term is S.L. Darwall’s (cf. Internalism and Agency, “Philosophical 
Perspectives” 6 [1992], p. 155; see also his Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of 
Morality: An Introduction, in S.L. Darwall-A. Gibbard-P. Railton, eds, Moral 
Discourse and Practice. Some Philosophical Approaches [Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1997], p. 308). 
(9) Cf. R.M. Hare, Internalism and Externalism in Ethics (1996), in his Objective 
Prescriptions and Other Essays, p. 96. 
(10) Cf. W.K. Frankena, Obligation and Motivation in Recent Moral Philosophy, in 
A.I. Melden, ed., Essays in Moral Philosophy (Seattle: University of Washington 
Press, 1958), p. 56. 
(11) Cf. R. Audi, Moral Knowledge and Ethical Character (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), p. 224. 
(12) Cf. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, p. 457. It is a debated question, 
however, whether Hume really was a judgement internalist. For a negative answer 
to this question, see C. Brown, Is Hume an Internalist?, “Journal of the History of 
Philosophy” 26 (1988): pp. 69-87. 
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(13) Externalist descriptivism is the view held by G.E. Moore, H.A. Prichard, W.D. 
Ross, and W.K. Frankena, and, more recently, by P. Railton, D. Copp, and D. 
Brink. On the contrary, W.D. Falk, and, more recently, T. Nagel, J. McDowell, D. 
Wiggins, and M. Smith have developed different forms of internalist descriptivism. 
(14) Cf. W.D. Ross, Foundations of Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1939), 
pp. 226-227. 
(15) A.J. Ayer (Language, Truth and Logic [London: Gollancz, 1936], ch. 6) and 
C.L. Stevenson (The Emotive Meaning of Ethical Terms, “Mind” 46 [1937]: pp. 14-
31) were not very specific in identifying the candidate non-cognitive states voiced in 
moral judgements. P.H. Nowell-Smith rejected the term “desire” (or “wanting”) in 
favour of “pro-attitude”, since he regarded the former as too vague to cover all of 
the non-cognitive states (cf. Ethics [1954] [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957], p. 99). 
For Hare moral judgements express universal preferences (cf. Moral Thinking: Its 
Levels, Method and Point [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981], pp. 91, 94-116, 185, 
220-228). Simon Blackburn (How To Be an Ethical Anti-Realist [1988], in his 
Essays in Quasi-Realism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993], pp. 168-169) 
and Mark Timmons (Morality without Foundations. A Defence of Ethical 
Contextualism [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999], pp. 138-144) are quite 
catholic about the possible candidate non-cognitive states expressed by moral 
judgements. For Allan Gibbard moral judgements are expressions of commitments 
to norms regulating guilt and anger (cf. Wise Choices, Apt Feelings. A Theory of 
Normative Judgment [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990], pp. 6-9, 41-47, 126-129, 
147-150, 172-173). 
(16) This notion, which was introduced by G.E.M. Anscombe (cf. Intention [1957] 
[Oxford: Blackwell, 1976], p. 56), is central to Michael Smith’s argument for strong 
motivational internalism (cf. The Moral Problem [Oxford: Blackwell, 1994], p. 116).  
(17) For a rejection of the definition of direction of fit in terms of the locus of 
responsibility for correspondence between an attitude and the world, see J.D. 
Velleman, The Possibility of Practical Reason (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), pp. 
111-112. 
(18) Cf. J. Dancy, Practical Reality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), p. 14. 
(19) Cf. ibid., pp. 82-84. 
(20) Cf. M. Staude, Wanting, Desiring, and Valuing: The Case against Conativism, 
in J. Marks, ed., The Ways of Desire. New Essays in Philosophical Psychology on the 
Concept of Wanting (Chicago: Preceding Publishing, 1986), p. 189.   
(21) Cf. F.O. Oppenheim, Non-cognitivismo, razionalità e relativismo, “Rivista di 
filosofia” 78 (1987), p. 29. 
(22) Cf. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), p. 
67, and, more explicitly, Freedom and Reason (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1963), pp. 168-169, and Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method and Point, pp. 53-61, 
152-155.  
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(23) This is one of the cases where moral words are used with no evaluative 
meaning at all (cf. R.M. Hare, The Language of Morals, p. 124).  
(24) Cf. D.O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1989), p. 46; see also his Externalist Moral Realism, 
in N. Gillespie, ed., Moral Realism: Proceedings of the 1985 Spindel Conference, 
“The Southern Journal of Philosophy”, Supplement 24 (1986), p. 30. 
(25) Cf. D.O. Brink, Moral Realism and the Foundations of Ethics, p. 48. 
(26) Cf. R.M. Hare, Internalism and Externalism in Ethics, p. 104. For a 
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(28) Cf. T. Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), p. 
29. A similar, albeit not identical, distinction has been drawn by Stephen Schiffer 
between “reason-providing” and “reason-following” desires (cf. A Paradox of 
Desire, “American Philosophical Quarterly” 13 [1976], p. 197). T.M. Scanlon 
expresses Nagel’s distinction in terms of a distinction between mere urges and 
“desires in the directed-attention sense” (cf. What We Owe to Each Other 
[Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998], pp. 38-39). 
(29) For a similar view see P. Foot, Reasons for Action and Desires (1972), in her 
Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 
1978), p. 149. 
(30) This objection has been raised by Mark Platts (cf. Moral Realities: An Essay in 
Philosophical Psychology [London: Routledge, 1991], p. 53). 
(31) Cf. J. McDowell, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?, 
“Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society”. Supplementary Volume 52 (1978), p. 
18.  
(32) In order to avoid such a difficulty J.E.J. Altham has introduced the term 
“besire” (cf. The Legacy of Emotivism, in G. Macdonald-C. Wright, eds, Facts, 
Science and Morality: Essays on A.J. Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic [Oxford: 
Blackwell, 1986], p. 284). 
(33) Cf. J. McDowell, Non-Cognitivism and Rule Following, in S.H. Holtzman-C. 
Leich eds, Wittgenstein: To Follow a Rule (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 
1981), p. 154. 
(34) Cf. J. McDowell, Virtue and Reason (1979), in R. Crisp-M. Slote, eds., Virtue 
Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 162. 
(35) Cf. J. McDowell, Are Moral Requirements Hypothetical Imperatives?, p. 22. 
(36) Cf. J. McDowell, Virtue and Reason, p. 159. 
(37) Cf. M. Stocker, Desiring the Bad: An Essay in Moral Psychology, “The Journal 
of Philosophy” 76 (1979), p. 744. 
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